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Abstract Factive predicates can prevent wh-movement from the clauses they embed
(Cinque 1990). This factive island effect has recently been analysed as resulting
from pragmatic constraints on questions: wh-extraction is thought to be prohibited
either because the resulting interrogative is systematically infelicitous (Schwarz &
Simonenko 2018b), or because it is systematically blocked by competing interrog-
ative forms (Schwarz, Oshima & Simonenko 2019). This paper notes empirical
problems for both of these accounts, and offers an alternative explanation of fac-
tive islands in terms of IL-triviality, a novel extension of the notion of L-triviality
(Gajewski 2002) to interrogative sentences.
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1 Introduction
Factive predicates can create factive islands, prohibiting certain wh-extractions from
a complement clause. For instance, subject extraction succeeds in (1a), featuring the
non-factive think, but is unacceptable in (1b), featuring the factive know:1
(1) a. Whoi does Sam think [ti is the tallest of the students]?
b. *Whoi does Sam know [ti is the tallest of the students]?
While early literature on factive islands focus on the role of the embedding predicate
(e.g., Cinque 1990, Rooryck 1992), later literature has noted that factivity is not
generally sufficient to prohibit extraction (e.g., Szabolcsi & Zwarts 1993, Oshima
2007). In (1b), the failure of wh-extraction also depends on the uniqueness of the
predicate applied to the gapped element. If we substitute the definite description the
tallest of the students for an indefinite description, extraction succeeds:
(2) Whoi does Sam know [ti is a tall student]?
* For many valuable comments, I am grateful to Nadine Theiler, Anders Schoubye, the audience and
reviewers of SALT 30, and the audience of the 2019 Principles of formal semantics workshop.
1 The judgments may vary with (among other things) one’s tendency towards echo question readings
and cleft readings; see Section 4.3. Anecdotally, the latter tendency appears strong for speakers of
languages like Swedish, where clefted interrogatives are extremely common (Brandtler 2019).
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Given this, a factive island will here be taken to be an environment characterized
by (i) a factive embedding predicate, and (ii) uniqueness of the questioned element,
encoded for instance by the predicate applied to the trace in the embedded clause.
The apparent dependence on non-syntactic factors like factivity and uniqueness
has made factive islands a central target for theories about “meaning-driven unac-
ceptability” (Schwarz & Simonenko 2018b): unacceptability that seems to derive
from constraints on meaning rather than from constraints on form.2 As the earliest
“meaning-driven” account, Szabolcsi & Zwarts (1993) proposed that factive islands
derive from a mismatch between the semantic type of the domain of the wh-word
and the operation denoted by its scope. Abrusán (2014) gives several arguments
against this, and instead proposes that factive island constructions have contradictory
presuppositions, and therefore are out. However, her analysis requires that presuppo-
sitions from the scope of a wh-word project universally with respect to the restrictor
(see Section 4), which is not always the case (Schwarz & Simonenko 2018a).
More recently, Schwarz & Simonenko (2018b) (building on Oshima 2007)
propose that factive islands result from necessary infelicity: they are unacceptable
because they can never be felicitously used. Schwarz et al. (2019) show that the
infelicity analysis fails to extend to factive island effects in multiple wh-questions,
and propose an alternative account in terms of necessary blocking. On this analysis,
both single and multiple wh-constructions involving factive islands are unacceptable
because they are systematically dispreferred to competing interrogative forms.
This paper argues that both the necessary infelicity and the necessary blocking
account suffer from empirical over- and undergeneration problems. I propose that
factive island constructions are instead unacceptable because they are IL-trivial:
They never have more than one defined answer, regardless of how their non-logical
terms are interpreted. The notion of IL-triviality is a novel complement to the
increasingly influential notion of L-triviality, proposed by Gajewski (2002, 2009).
Like Schwarz & Simonenko (2018b) and Schwarz et al. (2019), I will focus on
factive island constructions where uniqueness follows from well-known mechanisms,
like the presuppositions of the definite article (see (1b)). For a brief discussion of
constructions in which establishing uniqueness requires more involved reasoning,
like those involving extraction of how and why adjuncts, see Section 4.3.
(3) a. {Whyi/Howi} does Kim think that Max travelled to Rio ti?
b. *{Whyi/Howi} does Kim know that Max travelled to Rio ti?
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the necessary infelicity and the
necessary blocking accounts factive islands, and presents some problems for both.
2 By “unacceptability”, I will generally mean the strong, ungrammaticality-like type of unacceptability
that many speakers get with factive island violations, to distinguish from mere infelicity or oddness.
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Section 3 introduces Gajewski’s notion of L-triviality, and proposes a complementary
notion of IL-triviality defined for interrogative sentences. Section 4 uses this notion
to give a new analysis of factive islands, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Pragmatic accounts of factive islands
Before introducing Schwarz & Simonenko 2018b and Schwarz et al. 2019, I will
summarize the basic assumptions these works make about the semantics of questions.
Both assume a Hamblin (Hamblin 1973) question semantics, according to which
interrogative sentences denote sets of propositions, intuitively corresponding to the
possible answers to the interrogative. For example, at a world w with the individuals
Sam (s), Kim (k), and Max (m), the interrogative Who left? denotes the set in (4)
(provided it is defined, see below):






I will refer to interrogative sentence denotations as questions. The intension of
an interrogative is a thus a function from worlds to questions. This function may
be partial, restricted to a set of possible worlds corresponding to presupposed
information. For example, wh-interrogatives are standardly taken to trigger the




Then the intension of (5) is a function from worlds where this (underlined) presup-
position is true, to sets of propositions, each of which captures that a certain (atomic)
individual left.
(6) JWho left?K = λw : ∃x(leftw(x)).{λw′.leftw′(x) | humanw(x)}
Answers can presuppose things, so the propositions contained in a question can also
be partial. For instance, at a world w where the interrogative Who left the room? is
defined, its answers presuppose the existence of a unique (salient) room:
(7) JWho left the room?Kw
= {λw′ : ∃!y(roomw′(y)).leftw′(ιy.roomw′(y))(x) | humanw(x)}
2.1 Necessary infelicity
Schwarz & Simonenko (2018b) elaborate on ideas by Oshima (2007), and argue
148
Factive Islands and IL-triviality
that factive islands result from necessary infelicity: constructions like (1b), repeated
below, are unacceptable because they have jointly unsatisfiable felicity conditions.
(1b) *Whoi does Sam know ti is the tallest of the students?
Felicity conditions are understood as relations between sentences, interpretations,
and context sets (Stalnaker 1978); sets of possible worlds corresponding to the
intersection of a common ground. Interrogative sentences are assumed to have the
felicity conditions given below. I use dom(JϕKI) to denote the set of worlds where
ϕ is defined, with respect to the interpretation I.
Felicity conditions (adapted from Schwarz & Simonenko 2018b). An interrog-
ative sentence Q is felicitous with respect to an interpretation I and a context
set c only if (i) c⊆ dom(JQKI) (the presuppositions of Q are entailed by c),
and there is an answer p ∈ JQKI such that (ii) c⊆ dom(p) (the presupposi-
tions of p are entailed by c), and (iii) c 6⊆ p (p is not entailed by c).
The combination of clauses (ii) and (iii) is called the answerability condition.
On Schwarz & Simonenko’s account, the necessary infelicity of factive island
constructions results from a clash between felicity condition (i) and the answerability
condition: one cannot be satisfied without violating the other. The reasoning requires
the assumption that wh-questions come with an existential presupposition, as in (8).
(8) *Who does Sam know is the tallest of the students?
presup
=⇒ Someone is such that Sam knows that they are the tallest of the students.
Granting this assumption, we can show that (1b)/(8) is necessarily infelicitous.
For a reductio, suppose that I = (M,w,g), c is an interpretation and a context set,
respectively, with respect to which (8) is felicitous. By clause (i), c entails the
existential presupposition of (8) with respect to I:
(A) c⊆ J∃!x(tallest-student(x) & know(s,x = ιy.tallest-student(y))KI
By clause (ii), c must also entail the presupposition of at least one answer to (8) in I.
In fact, it must entail the presupposition of exactly one answer: as indicated in (9),
the answers to (8) have mutually incompatible presuppositions. Each answer to (8)
presupposes for some individual d, that d is the unique tallest student of Sam’s.
(9) JWho does Sam know is the tallest of the students?KI
= {λw′ : !tallest-studentw′(d).
knoww′(s,d = ιy.tallest-student(y)) | humanw(d)}
(‘!tallest-student(d)’ abbreviates ‘tallest-student(d) & ∀y(tallest-student(y)↔
y = d)’.) Say that c entails the presupposition of the answer (10), so that (B) holds:
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(10) λw′ : !tallest-studentw′(a).knoww′(s,a = ιy.tallest-student(y))
(B) c⊆ J!tallest-student(a)KI
Now, the combination of (A) and (B) implies (C); that is, that c entails (10).
(C) c⊆ J!tallest-student(a).know(s,a = ιy.tallest-student(y))KI
Thus the only answer defined in c is also entailed by c, in violation of condition (iii).
We have a contradiction, and can conclude that (8) is infelicitous with respect to
c and I. Since these were arbitrary, this shows that (8) is necessarily infelicitous.
According to Schwarz & Simonenko, this explains the unacceptability of (8) and
other factive island constructions like it.
2.2 Necessary blocking
Schwarz, Oshima & Simonenko (2019) show that the necessary infelicity account
cannot explain factive islands that appear in multiple wh-questions, like (11a):
(11) a. *Who knows [that Caesar was murdered where]?
b. Who thinks [that Caesar was murdered where]?
c. ?Who knows [that Caesar sent troops where]? (Schwarz et al. 2019)
The acceptability of (11b) indicates that the unacceptability of (11a) depends on
the factivity of the embedding verb. Despite slight markedness, the acceptability of
(11c) indicates that the unacceptability of (11a) also depends on the uniqueness of
the predicate in the embedded clause: one (typically) cannot get murdered at more
than one location, but one (typically) can send troops to more than one location.
Unlike single wh-questions involving factive island violations, constructions like
(11a) can have answers with compatible presuppositions. For instance, consider an
interpretation I with two possible knowers, Sam (s) and Kim (k), and two possible
locations, Rome (r) and Alexandria (a). Then (11a) denotes a question with four
answers, each of which shares its presupposition with another answer:














This means that even a context where it is established that Someone knows where
Caesar was murdered (satisfying condition (i)) can entail the presupposition of some
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answer (satisfying condition (ii)) without entailing that answer itself (satisfying
condition (iii)). For instance, consider any c where it is established that one of r1
and r2 are true, but not which one. Then c entails that Caesar was murdered in Rome
(satisfying condition (ii) w.r.t. I), that Sam or Kim knows this (satisfying condition
(i)), but leaves open which one (satisfying condition (iii)). Thus (11a) is felicitous in
c, meaning that its unacceptability cannot be attributed to necessary infelicity.
To improve on this (lack of) prediction, Schwarz et al. (2019) propose an alterna-
tive account of factive islands in terms of necessary blocking. On this account, factive
island constructions are unacceptable because they are necessarily dispreferred to
competing interrogative forms, according to the below definition.
Blocking (adapted from Schwarz et al. 2019). An interrogative sentence Q is
blocked by an interrogative sentence Q′ with respect to I,c just in case
(i) for all p ∈ JQKI defined at c, p ∈ JQ′KI , and (ii) Q′ is syntactically simpler
than Q is, and/or (iii) Q′ has stronger presuppositions than Q (satisfied in c).
In other words, Q′ blocks Q if any (defined) answer to Q is also an answer to Q′, and
Q′ is less marked and/or presupposes more than Q, provided these presuppositions
are actually satisfied (cf. Heim’s (1991) Maximize presupposition!). A sentence is
necessarily blocked if it is blocked with respect to all interpretation-context pairs I,c
where it felicitous (given Schwarz & Simonenko’s felicity conditions; Section 2.1).
Schwarz et al. show that both single and multiple wh-constructions involving
factive island violations are necessarily blocked. Consider again (11a)/(13):
(13) *Who knows that Caesar was murdered where?
By felicity condition (ii), if (13) is felicitous with respect to an interpretation I and
a context set c, then c entails the presupposition of at least one answer to (13) in I.
As exemplified in (12), the answers to (13) presuppose, for some location l, that l is
the location of Caesar’s murder. Then by assumption c entails, for some location l,
that l is the location of Caesar’s murder. This makes the multiple wh-question (13)
blocked by the single wh-question (14):
(14) Who knows that Caesar was murdered in l?
presup
=⇒ Caesar was murdered in l.
The set of defined answers to (13) is always a subset of the set of answers to (14).
Given the interpretation I from (11a), (13) is felicitous in c if c entails either that
Caesar was murdered in Rome, or that he was murdered in Alexandria. If the former,
l = Rome and J(14)KI = {r1,r2}; if the latter, l = Alexandria and J(14)KI = {a1,a2}.
Moreover, the single wh-question (14) is intuitively less complex than the multi-
ple wh-question (13). Since the condition for blocking requires a less complex form
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or stronger presuppositions, this suffices to establish that (13) is necessarily blocked
by single wh-questions like (14).3 According to Schwarz et al., this explains the
unacceptability of (13) and multiple wh-interrogatives like it. Similar reasoning to
the above shows that single wh-questions like (8) is necessarily blocked by polar
questions like (15b), where x is the tallest person according to a given context set.
(15) a. *Whoi does Sam know ti is the tallest of the students?
b. Does Sam know that x is the tallest of the students?
2.3 Problems for pragmatic accounts
Both the infelicity analysis and the blocking analysis derive the unacceptability
of factive island constructions from conditions on their felicitous use as matrix
questions. These analyses therefore do not explain why the unacceptability persists
when factive island constructions are not used as matrix questions. For instance,
Oshima (2007) notes that the factive island construction (16a) is in no way improved
by being embedded under an attitude verb, as in (16b):
(16) a. *Whyi does Ken know [that Alice insulted Pat ti]?
b. *John wonders [whyi Ken knows [that Alice insulted Pat ti]].
The declarative sentence (16b) is hardly subject to the answerability condition
posited for (16a). To wit, a sentence like (17) can be felicitously used in a context
where it is established that Alice insulted Pat (and did nothing else), even though
this would violate the answerability condition of the embedded question.
(17) John wonders [whati Ken knows [that Alice did ti]].
Thus, it seems like (16b) as a whole is not necessarily infelicitous: in theory, it can
be felicitously used in any context where John believes that Ken knows why Alice
insulted Pat (the presupposition triggered by wonder). This means that (16b) is also
not necessarily blocked. A context set c for (16b) can entail that Alice insulted Pat
because r, without entailing that John believes this. Then c does not satisfy the
presuppositions of a construction like (18), which therefore cannot block (16b).
(18) John wonders [whether Ken knows [that Alice insulted Pat because r]].
presup
=⇒ John believes [that Alice insulted Pat because r].
This is a problem of undergeneration. Both pragmatic accounts also have prob-
3 Unlike Schwarz & Simonenko (2018b), Schwarz et al. assume that wh-questions do not presup-
pose existence. Then (14), which felicitously presupposes that Caesar was murdered at l, is also
presuppositionally stronger than (13), which on these assumptions presupposes nothing.
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lems of overgeneration. The infelicity analysis predicts that any interrogative with
tautologous or contradictory answers, like (19), are out.
(19) Who is [happy or not happy]?
While odd, (19) is hardly unacceptable—for one, it has rhetorical uses. However,
(19) necessarily violates the answerability condition. This required for felicity of
an interrogative Q with respect to I,c, that there be some answer p ∈ JQKI not
entailed by c. Since any individual is either happy or not happy, all p ∈ J(19)KI are
tautologies. A tautology is entailed by any c. Thus all p ∈ J(19)KI are entailed by
any c, and (19) is never answerable, and so is necessarily infelicitous.
In order to exclude cases like (19), Schwarz & Simonenko (2018b: 269) suggest
that necessary infelicity only yields unacceptability when it results from a conflict
between multiple felicity conditions. This indeed distinguishes factive island con-
structions, where condition (i) clashes with the answerability condition, from (19),
where the answerability condition itself is unsatisfiable. However, this reasoning
seems fallacious: How can necessarily violating a conjunction of felicity conditions
result in unacceptability, while necessarily violating one of the conjuncts does not?
After all, the violation of a conjunct implies the violation of the conjunction.
(19) is also necessarily blocked, since it is never felicitous. Similarly, (20) is
necessarily blocked by anything less complex or presuppositional, since none of its
answers are defined: they each presuppose that someone has an impossible property.
(20) Who do you know is [both happy and not happy]?
To sum up: While both pragmatic accounts cover standard factive island construc-
tions, only the blocking account extends to factive islands in multiple wh-questions.
Crucially, neither account can explain the unacceptability of factive island construc-
tions outside of matrix questions, and both accounts overgenerate and predict that
any interrogative with tautologous or contradictory answers is unacceptable on a par
with factive island constructions. The next section will outline the prerequisites for
an alternative account, aimed at overcoming the problems of the pragmatic accounts.
3 Interrogative Logical Triviality
Factive islands seem to arise due to constraints on meaning, rather than constraints
on form. Many cases of unacceptability seem to be meaning-driven in this sense.
For instance, there is a sharp difference in acceptability within the minimal pair in
(21), and within the minimal pair in (22), but no relevant differences in form.
(21) There is {some/*every} book on the table.
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(22) I’ve read {*some/every} book but War and Peace.
What, then, is wrong the meanings of the starred examples? According to Zucchi
(1995), the badness of *There is every book... is due to the felicity conditions of
the sentence making incompatible demands. The felicity conditions of existential
there-sentences require the context set to be compatible with the set of books being
empty, but a felicitous use of every book requires the context set to entail that there
is at least one book. Like the pragmatic analyses of factive islands, this assumes
that unacceptability of the relevant strength can be driven by constraints that pertain
to the felicity conditions of the sentence, and therefore would be subject to simliar
problems with embeddability.
Several classic works in formal semantics (e.g., Barwise & Cooper 1981; von
Stechow 1984; von Fintel 1993) discuss an alternative possibility: that the starred
examples in (21) and (22) are bad because they are logically trivial (tautologous or
contradictory). Indeed, *There is every... is tautologous on the Barwise & Cooper
(1981) semantics for existential there-sentences, while *some ... but constructions
are contradictory on von Fintel’s (1993) semantics for exceptive but. As these works
note, however, this is not sufficient to explain the severity of the unacceptability of
these sentences, which to most people are not just odd, but unacceptable, often to the
degree that they are perceived as ungrammatical. Many trivial sentences are clearly
much more acceptable, as evidenced by their ability to be communicatively used:
(23) a. Interviewer: Truth is truth ...
b. R. Giuliani: No, it isn’t truth! Truth isn’t truth.4
Gajewski (2002, 2009) proposed a principled way of distinguishing “pathologically”
trivial (declarative) sentences, like *There is every... and *some ... but sentences (on
the given semantics’), from ordinary trivial sentences, like the ones in (23). This
section introduces his suggestion (subsection 3.1), and proposes a complementary
means for distinguishing interrogative sentences with pathological meanings (3.2).
3.1 L-triviality
The key idea of Gajewski 2002, 2009 is that that the triviality of a sentence is
pathological only if it is to a certain extent independent of the interpretation of the
sentence’ non-logical vocabulary. Then the sentence is L(ogically)-trivial, and is in
virtue of this, Gajewski postulates, unacceptable or (perceived as) ungrammatical.5
The class of “(non-)logical” vocabulary is notoriously difficult to define formally (see
e.g., Abrusán 2014: Ch. 6 for a relevant overview of attempts). Like Gajewski, I will
4 From this NBC interview, around 0.30.
5 Gajewski calls L-trivial sentences ungrammatical, simply.
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rely on fairly innocent stipulations about individual expressions, broadly assuming
that (i) logical expressions tend to be permutation invariant or closed-class, like
every, not, and the copula; and (ii) non-logical expressions tend to be variant and/or
open-class, like truth, good, and Sam.
Formally, a sentence is L-trivial just in case it is tautologous or contradictory
in every interpretation in which it is defined, for a non-uniform substitution of its
non-logical vocabulary. This is made precise by the following definitions:
Logical skeleton. A logical skeleton LS(ϕ) of an expression ϕ is obtained by
substituting every non-logical constituent ατ in ϕ for a new type τ constant.
L-triviality. A sentence ϕ is L-trivial if and only if, for any logical skeleton LS(ϕ)
of ϕ and any interpretation I where LS(ϕ) is defined: JLS(ϕ)KI = 1(0).
That is, a sentence is L-trivial just in case each of its logical skeletons are tautologous
or contradictory, or equivalently (I invite the reader to convince themselves of this), in
case one of them is. Note that any logical skeleton of (24) is contingent: for instance,
the one indicated to the right is true whenever JPK = JQK, and false otherwise.
(24) Truth is truth. LS7−→ P is Q.
Thus, (24) is not L-trivial. In contrast, the logical skeleton in (25) is trivial, assum-
ing the semantics for existential there-sentences proposed by Barwise & Cooper.
According to this, JThere is every PK is true given an interpretation I and domain D
just in case I(P)⊆ D. Of course, this is the case for any I,D, so that (25) is L-trivial.
(25) *There is every good book. LS7−→ There is every P.
This explains the difference in acceptability between (24) and (25), given the fol-
lowing generalization (adapted from Gajewski 2002, 2009): If a sentence has an
L-trivial constituent, then the sentence is unacceptable.
3.2 IL-triviality
The proposed connection between L-triviality and unacceptability has been used to
explain a range of different semantic phenomena, such as NPI licensing (Chierchia
2013), degree islands (Abrusán 2014; Fox & Hackl 2007), and selectional restrictions
of clause-embedding verbs (Theiler, Roelofsen & Aloni 2019; Mayr 2019). As a
general source of meaning-driven unacceptability, however, L-triviality is insuffi-
cient: It cannot be used to explain patterns of unacceptability in sentences which do
not express propositions, and thus lack truth-conditions. This excludes in particular
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interrogative sentences, which are taken to express sets of propositions (Hamblin
1973; Karttunen 1977) or partitions of logical space (Groenendijk & Stokhof 1984).
Still, it would be surprising if logical skeletons with invariant denotations sys-
tematically yield unacceptability only for certain clause types. But what kind of
invariant denotations could be pathological for interrogative sentences? Intuitively,
the communicative usefulness of a declarative sentence derives at least in part from
its ability to provide information: to express a proposition that can intersect with
an information state to produce a non-empty, proper substate. Tautologous and
contradictory sentences fail to do this, and are therefore communicatively deficient.
Correspondingly, the communicative usefulness of an interrogative can be thought
to come from its ability to disjoin information: to distinguish alternatives within
a given information state. When an interrogative fails to do this—intuitively, if it
has no more than one (defined) answer—it is communicatively deficient to a degree
comparable to that of a tautologous or contradictory declarative. The following
definition of I(nterrogative)L(ogical)-triviality implements the intuition that these
cases are analogous, assuming a Hamblin 1973 question semantics.6
IL-triviality. An interrogative sentence ϕ is IL-trivial iff, for any LS(ϕ) and inter-
pretation I where LS(ϕ) is defined: at most one p ∈ JLS(ϕ)KI is defined.
Corresponding to Gajewski’s generalization, I propose that If a sentence has an
IL-trivial constituent, then the sentence is unacceptable.
Unlike the pragmatic accounts discussed earlier, this will not predict unaccept-
ability for constructions like (26). If (26) presupposes that Someone is happy and
not happy, then it is never defined, making it necessarily infelicitous, and (trivially)
necessarily blocked. However, it is not IL-trivial: The indicated logical skeleton can
be defined and have multiple defined answers in any I : JQKI 6= JSKI .
(26) Who is [happy and not happy]? LS7−→ Which P is [Q and not S]?
4 Factive islands and IL-triviality
I will now outline the full account of factive islands in terms of IL-triviality. Af-
ter summarizing the assumptions to be made about the presuppositions of wh-
interrogatives, I show that standard cases of factive islands are covered by the
account (subsection 4.1), and that the analysis generalizes to factive islands in em-
bedded and mutliple wh-interrogatives (subsection 4.2). After summarizing, I will
also discuss an alternative definition of IL-triviality in terms of rescales, and briefly
compare its merits to the definition in terms of logical skeletons (subsection 4.3).
6 In Möller Kalpak 2018, I proposed a corresponding definition of IL-triviality in inquisitive semantics.
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Like the necessary blocking analysis, but unlike the necessary infelicity analysis,
the IL-triviality analysis will not depend on the assumption that wh-interrogatives
presuppose that at least one of their answers is true (the existential presupposition).7
Like both pragmatic accounts, but unlike Abrusán’s (2014) semantic account, the
IL-triviality analysis will be independent of whether scope presuppositions are taken
to project universally or existentially with respect to the wh-word’s restrictor.
(27) Which of these students does Sam know passed?
presup
=⇒ All of these students passed. Universal projection
presup
=⇒ Some of these students passed. Existential projection
It will only be necessary to consider the presuppositions of things we want to show
are not IL-trivial. If we can show that something is IL-trivial without assuming that
it is presuppositional, we thereby show that it would be IL-trivial if presuppositional.
4.1 Standard cases of factive islands
We begin by ensuring that IL-triviality accurately predicts the unacceptability of
“standard” (i.e., matrix, single wh-) factive island constructions, like (28).
(28) *Who does Sam know is the tallest of the students?
For any interpretation I = (M,w,g) where it is defined, (28) expresses (29):
(29) JWho does Sam know is the tallest of the students?KI
= {λw′ : tallest-studentw′(d) & ∀y(tallest-studentw′(d)↔ y = d).
knoww′(s,d = ιy.tallest-student(y)) | humanw(d)}
It is easy to see that this question can have at most one defined answer. Each answer
presupposes, for some individual d, that d is the unique tallest student. Of course at
most one individual can be the unique tallest student in I, meaning that at most one
answer can be defined: the one that agrees with I on who the tallest student is.
In order to confirm (29) is IL-trivial, we need to show that its logical skeleton
likewise has at most one defined answer. I will follow several previous authors
(Del Pinal 2017; Theiler et al. 2019; Mayr 2019) in assuming that attitude verbs are
generally decomposable into a purely logical component, responsible for presuppo-
sitions like factivity, and a non-logical component, encoding things like the verb’s
modal base. For instance, Del Pinal proposes that logical skeletons of know look
like (30), which is just like ordinary know, but with an arbitrary accessibility relation
7 Note that holds only if the negative answer allowed in the absence of an existential presupposition is
not treated as a semantic answer, i.e. is not taken to correspond to a proposition in the question.
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(here R) instead of a specifically doxastic accessibility relation.
(30) JLS(know)K = λ pλxλw : p(w) = 1.∀w′[w′ ∈ Rxw→ p(w′) = 1]
Given this, we obtain a logical skeleton of (28) by substituting the restrictor of the
wh-word for an arbitrary predicate constant Q, the proper name Sam for an individual
constant c, the non-logical predicate tallest of the students for the predicate constant
P, and the attitude predicate know for a predicate LS(know):
(31) *Who does Sam know is the tallest of the students?
LS7−→ Which Q does c LS(know) is the P?
For any interpretation I = (M,w,g) where it is defined, this skeleton expresses (32):
(32) JWhich Q does c LS(know) is the P?KI
= {λw′ : Pw′(x) & ∀y(Pw′(y)↔ x = y).LS(knoww′)(s,x= ιy.P(y)) |Qw(x)}
Just as for (28), it is easy to see that at most one answer in (32) can be defined at a
given world/interpretation. If JQKI is a singleton, then (32) is, too; trivially making
at most one answer defined. If JQKI is not a singleton, then (32) contains exactly
one answer for each d : I(d) ∈ JQKI , exactly one of which presupposes that
P(d) & ∀y(P(y)↔ d = y).
Of course, only one such presupposition can be true at I: only one individual d can
be the unique P. Thus at most one answer to LS((28)) can be defined at I, which,
since I was arbitrary, shows that (28) is IL-trivial.
Factivity. The IL-triviality of (28) depended on the factivity of the embedding
predicate: A sentence like (33), featuring a non-factive predicate, is not IL-trivial.
(33) Who does Sam think is the tallest of the students?
presup
=⇒ Sam believes that someone is the tallest of the students.
Without an embedding that presupposes the complement, the answers to (28) will
not have mutually incompatible presuppositions. Consider an interpretation I with
the two individuals Sam (s) and Alex (a), one of which Sam thinks is the tallest
student. Then (33) denotes a question with two non-presuppositional answers:
JWho does Sam think is the tallest of the students?KI
=
{
λw′.believew′(s, !tallest-student(s) & s = ιy.tallest(y)),
λw′.believew′(s, !tallest-student(a) & a = ιy.tallest(y))
}
This shows that (33) can have more than one defined answer, which entails that a
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logical skeleton of (33) likewise can have more than one defined answer. In other
words, I is a counterexample to the IL-triviality of (33).
Uniqueness. The IL-triviality of (28) likewise depends on the uniqueness of the
predicate in the complement clause: (34) lacks this, and is therefore not IL-trivial.
(34) Who does Sam know is a tall student?
presup
=⇒ Sam knows that someone is a tall student.
presup
=⇒ Someone/Everyone is a tall student.
While the answers to (34) are generally presuppositional, the absence of uniqueness
means that these presuppositions need not be mutually incompatible. Consider an
interpretation I with the two individuals Sam (s) and Alex (a), both of which are
tall students according to I. Then (34) is defined and denotes a question with two
answers, whose presuppositions are both defined:
JWho does Sam know is a tall student?KI
=
{
λw′ : tallw′(s) & studentw′(s).knoww′(s, tall(s) & student(s)),
λw′ : tallw′(a) & studentw′(a).knoww′(s, tall(a) & student(a))
}
This shows that (33), and by extension any LS((33)), can have more than one defined
answer, and so is not IL-trivial.
In conclusion, standard factive island constructions, like (28), are IL-trivial, and
are so in virtue of featuring the particular combination of factivity and uniqueness
characteristic of factive islands. Thus, the assumed connection between IL-triviality
and (un)acceptability can explain the unacceptability of these constructions.
4.2 Non-standard cases of factive islands
An account of factive islands in terms of IL-triviality thus handles “standard” cases
of factive islands just as well as the two pragmatic analyses discussed in Section
2 do. In addition, it extends more naturally than the pragmatic competitors to the
noted cases of “non-standard” factive island constructions: those in non-matrix
interrogatives, and those in multiple wh-interrogatives.
Factive islands in non-matrix clauses. Recall that the presence of an L-trivial
constituent is generally sufficient for a sentence to be unacceptable. For instance,
embeddings of the allegedly L-trivial (35a), like in (35b), are equally unacceptable:
(35) a. *I’ve read some book but War and Peace.
b. *Sam knows [that I’ve read some book but War and Peace].
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It is not immediately clear why unacceptability caused by L-triviality persists in this
way. Unlike ill-formed constituents, which compositionally make any construction
in which they appear uninterpretable, L-trivial constituents can occur in non-L-trivial
sentences (viz., (35a) is contingent on the von Fintel 1993 semantics). Still, whatever
will ultimately explains this attested behaviour of L-trivial sentences would likely
predict the corresponding behaviour for IL-trivial sentences. Thus any sentence
containing an IL-trivial construction is predicted to be unacceptable. In particular,
the unacceptability of sentences containing factive island constructions, like (36),
are explained by the IL-triviality of their embedded clause(s):
(36) *Alex knows [who Sam knows is the tallest of the students].
Factive islands in multiple wh-questions. Like the unacceptability caused by
ill-formedness, but unlike that caused by infelicity, unacceptability caused by L-
triviality also seems to be preserved under wh-extraction. For instance, (37a) is not
rendered acceptable through wh-clause formation as in (37b):
(37) a. *I’ve read some book but War and Peace.
b. *Whoi ti read some book but War and Peace?
If IL-triviality is indeed a good correlate to L-triviality, we should expect it too to
yield unacceptability that survives similar wh-extractions. This means in particular
that multiple wh-interrogatives containing factive island violations are predicted to be
unacceptable, in virtue of being derivable by extractions from IL-trivial constructions.
For instance, the unacceptability of (38a) would be explained by the IL-triviality of
(38b), since the former can be obtained from the latter by subject extraction.
(38) a. *Whoi ti knows that who j t j is the tallest of the students?
b. *Who j does Sam know t j is the tallest of the students?
4.3 Summary
The table in Figure 4.3 summarizes the predictions of the IL-triviality account
of factive islands, and compares it to the predictions of Schwarz & Simonenko’s
(2018b) necessary infelicity account and Schwarz et al.’s (2019) necessary blocking
account. As indicated, an account of factive islands in terms of IL-triviality not
only makes the right predictions with respect to standard cases of factive islands, but
also (by analogy to L-triviality) extends to predict the unacceptability of multiple
wh- and non-matrix interrogatives containing factive island violations. Unlike both
the necessary infelicity and the necessary blocking analysis, it does this without
overgenerating to acceptable trivial questions like (39a) and (39b). As noted in Sec-
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Necessary infelicity Necessary blocking IL-triviality
Standard FIs 3 3 3
Multiple wh-FIs 7 3 3
Non-matrix FIs 7 7 3
Trivial questions 7 7 3
Figure 1 Summary of predictions.
tion 3.2, constructions like (26)/(39a) are not IL-trivial, and neither are constructions
like (39b) (counterexample: any interpretation I : JQKI 6= JSKI).
(39) a. Who is [happy and not happy]?
b. Who do you know is both [happy and not happy]?
LS7−→ Which P does c LS(know) is [Q and not S]?
Before concluding, I will briefly discuss (i) some factors that may obviate factive
island effects, and (ii) the possibility of an alternative definition of IL-triviality.
A note on obviations. Sometimes, extraction from a factive island seems accept-
able. For instance, certain additions of possibility modals seem to license extraction
(Abrusán 2014), likely by eliminating uniqueness (Schwarz & Simonenko 2018b).
I will note two cases which are not previously discussed, but which could be ex-
plained on the present account. First, as suggested by Una Stojnić (p.c.), clefted
wh-interrogatives seem more acceptable than their non-clefted counterparts:
(40) (?)Who is it that Sam knows is the tallest of the students?
It-clefts are generally assumed to presuppose at most existence and exhaustivity (e.g.,
Büring & Kriz 2013), approximated below:
(41) It is [Kim]F that Sam knows is the tallest student.
presup
=⇒ Someone is known by Sam to be the tallest student.
presup
=⇒ If Kim is known by Sam to be the tallest student, then nobody else is.
Clearly, the conjunction of these presuppositions would not contradict the corre-
sponding presuppositions of, say, It is [Alex]F that Sam knows is the tallest students.
Thus the answers in a question denoted by (40) will have compatible presuppositions,
meaning that it cannot be IL-trivial, and is not predicted to be unacceptable.
Unsurprisingly, factive island constructions are also improved by echo-question
readings. The echo question (42a) is fine, while the interrogative in (42b)—where
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an echo question reading is blocked by the low focus—remains bad.
(42) a. [Who]F does Sam know is the tallest of the students?
b. *Who does Sam know is [the tallest]F of the students?
On the present account, this pattern could be explained by adopting a metalinguistic
account of echo questions (Sudo 2007). On such an account, echo questions—and
presumably, also their answers—accommodate any presuppositions present on a
non-echo reading. Then these answers are not presuppositional, and will always be
defined. In this case (42a) is not IL-trivial, and thus not predicted to be unacceptable.
Skeletons or rescales? For reasons having to do with co-bound traces, Del Pinal
(2017) argues that L-triviality should not be calculated with respect to logical
skeletons, but instead with respect to rescales. To define these, let any RESCALEi:i∈N
be a subsective modifier (i.e., JRESCALEi(α)K⊆ JαK), whose value otherwise varies
with the interpretation. Then a rescale of a sentence φ is the result of replacing each
minimal non-logical constituent token α in φ with RESCALEi(α), for a fresh i, viz.:
(43) Kim is tall and not tall.
Rescale: RESCALE1(Kim) is RESCALE2(tall) and not RESCALE3(tall).
We can implement this in the definitions of L-triviality and IL-triviality:
L-triviality II. A declarative sentence S is L-trivial iff, for any rescale S′ of S and
any interpretation I where S′ is defined: JS′KI = 1(0).
IL-triviality II. An interrogative sentence Q is IL-trivial iff, for any rescale Q′ of
Q and interpretation I where Q′ is defined: at most one p ∈ JQ′KI is defined.
With respect to factive islands, a definition of IL-triviality in terms of rescales has
potential advantages over a definition in terms of logical skeletons. First, recall the
examples of factive island constructions with how and why from the introduction:
(44) *{Whyi/Howi} does Kim know that Max travelled to Rio ti?
Oshima (2007) and Schwarz & Simonenko (2018b) argue that the presuppositions of
the answers to (44) are indeed mutually incompatible, but that this is a result of them
concerning reasons and manners. In the logical skeletons of (44), the restrictors of
the wh-words are swapped for arbitrary constants. Thus, these skeletons will not
always be interpreted as why- or how-questions. In contrast, the rescales of (44) will
be interpreted as such, since they only involve semantic narrowing of the original
restrictors. Thus (44) would only count as IL-trivial on IL-triviality II.
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Relatedly, Oshima (2007) and Schwarz & Simonenko (2018b) argue that the
questioned element in a factive island construction need not be unique by logical
necessity. For instance, it is logically possible to be murdered at more than one
location, yet (45) is unacceptable (according to Schwarz et al. 2019):
(45) *Wherei does Max know [that Caesar was murdered ti]?
However, the location queried by (45) is unique with respect to what Schwarz et al.
call the accessible interpretations: roughly, interpretations that are especially normal
or typical, like (arguably) the ones where one does not get murdered at more than
one place. With respect only to such interpretations, (45) is IL-trivial according to
the definition using rescales, but not according to the one using logical skeletons. A
rescale of (45) will still express a question about a location of murder, while a logical
skeleton does not even express the queried individual need not even be a location.
It is not clear exactly what determines (or should determine) which interpretations
are “accessible”, making a relativization of (I)L-triviality to such contexts a non-
innocent move. For instance, can the set of accessible interpretations, and thereby
the set of (I)L-trivial sentences, vary with context? Then we seem to be tracking a
type of unacceptability quite different from the one originally targeted by Gajewski’s
L-triviality.8 A more conservative explanation may be given by noting that it seems
particularly easy to mistake sentences like (45) for IL-trivial sentences during an
on-line assessment. Some types of interpretations will intuitively be easier to access
in a certain context; these will be the ones that we use to assess (I)L-triviality, but
not the ones that actually determine it. Further investigation of this option, as well
as a more thorough comparison between definitions, must be left to future work.
5 Conclusion
This paper argued that the unacceptability of factive island constructions stems from
a semantic deficiency: factive island constructions sound bad because they are IL-
trivial. If this is correct, the analysis of factive islands does not require the assumption
that there are any essentially pragmatic sources of perceived ungrammaticality in
natural language, pace Schwarz & Simonenko (2018b); Schwarz et al. (2019). This
does not exclude the possibility or usefulness of an external pragmatic rationale
for the assumed connection between (I)L-triviality and perceived ungrammaticality.
Yet, the predictive differences between the analysis proposed here and the pragmatic
analyses point to the value of keeping such a rationale separate from the core
explanatory features of the analysis of factive islands.
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